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 Abstract 
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of how the European Emission 
Trading System (EU ETS) as the core climate policy instrument of the European 
Union has impacted innovation. Towards this end, we investigate the impact of 
the EU ETS on research, development, and demonstration (RD&D), adoption, 
and organizational change. In doing so, we pay particular attention to the rela-
tive influences of context factors (policy mix, market factors, public acceptance) 
as well as firm characteristics (value chain position, technology portfolio, size, 
vision). Empirically, our analysis is based on multiple case studies with 19 
power generators, technology providers, and project developers in the German 
power sector which we conducted from June 2008 until June 2009. We find that 
the innovation impact of the EU ETS has remained limited so far because of the 
scheme’s initial lack in stringency and predictability and the relatively greater 
importance of context factors. Additionally, the impact varies tremendously 
across technologies, firms, and innovation dimensions, and is most pronounced 
for RD&D on carbon capture technologies and corporate procedural change. 
Our analysis suggests that the EU ETS by itself may not provide sufficient in-
centives for fundamental changes in corporate climate innovation activities at a 
level adequate for reaching political long-term targets. Based on the study’s 
findings, we derive a set of policy and research recommendations. 
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1  Introduction  
Despite the setback in Copenhagen (UNFCCC, 2009), the delicate global nego-
tiations for a successor of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1997) as well as the 
implementation of a variety of climate policies around the world (IEA, 2009a) 
reveal an increasing political will to limit climate change (UNFCCC, 1992). In a 
pioneering move, in 2005 the European Union introduced the world’s largest 
multi-country greenhouse gas emission trading system, the EU ETS, represent-
ing the cornerstone of its climate policy (EU, 2003). The main advantage of this 
cap-and-trade scheme going back to the seminal work of Dales (1968) is its 
static efficiency: by establishing a price for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 
and granting participating companies flexibility in their choice of compliance 
strategies, the instrument promises the cost-minimal achievement of its emis-
sion cap (Tietenberg, 1985, Baumol and Oates, 1988). In addition, by establish-
ing a price for carbon such a trading scheme is expected to generate dynamic 
incentives for the development and diffusion of low carbon technologies (for an 
overview, see Fischer, 2005). In line with this theory-based economic reasoning 
regarding the superiority of economic instruments for spurring innovation (Jaffe 
et al., 2002, Requate, 2005, Vollebergh, 2007, Popp et al., 2009), a number of 
other countries are in the process of implementing their own emission trading 
schemes. However, the actual implementation of the EU ETS has cast doubts 
over its capacity for triggering innovation, although this may be its most impor-
tant property for achieving the required deep greenhouse gas emission cuts 
(IPCC, 2007b). Therefore, this article sets out to improve the understanding of 
the innovation impact of the EU ETS. 
The existing literature on the innovation impact of the EU ETS can be differenti-
ated into those studies trying to anticipate the scheme’s impact and those con-
ducting ex-post evaluations. Regarding the former, based on theoretical and 
empirical evidence from US trading schemes for SO2, NOx and lead (for an 
overview, see Hansjürgens, 2006), Gagelmann and Frondel (2005) conclude 
that the innovation impact of the EU ETS in its pilot phase from 2005-07 is likely 
to be limited. As main reasons for this they identify the generous initial alloca-
tion of EU ETS allowances as well as the linking with the project-based Kyoto 
Mechanisms Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) without upper limits (EU, 2004), and the distribution of allowances free-
of-charge. Schleich and Betz (2005) arrive at a similar conclusion by discussing 
the potential innovation relevance of EU ETS design choices. These innovation-
specific studies are complemented by broader analyses on the economic impli-2  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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cations of the design of the EU ETS (e.g. Egenhofer et al., 2006, Ellerman and 
Joskow, 2008). For example, two innovation-relevant aspects of the EU ETS 
having been analyzed are the distortionary incentives arising from the treatment 
of new entrants and closures as well as the short trading phases and resulting 
investment uncertainties (Neuhoff et al., 2006, Ahman et al., 2007, Ellermann, 
2008, Hoffmann et al., 2008). It thus comes as no surprise that the rare ex-post 
evidence indicates a rather limited actual innovation impact of the EU ETS, par-
ticularly on research and development and long-term portfolio decisions (Hoff-
mann, 2007, Cames, 2008). However, these early studies do not cover all as-
pects relevant for such an analysis (del Río González, 2009) and do not con-
sider the more stringent second trading phase (2008-12) and the ambitious re-
vision of the EU ETS post-2012 (Schleich et al., 2009). 
Against this background, it is the aim of this paper to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of how the EU ETS has impacted innovation and whether it does so at 
a level adequate for reaching the long-term political targets required for a de-
carbonization of the economy. In doing so, we address several of the research 
recommendations brought forward for studying the determinants of environ-
mental technological change (del Río González, 2009). We build our research 
framework on environmental economics and innovation studies (Fagerberg and 
Verspagen, 2009) and extend the existing studies in four respects: First, we 
distinguish innovation into the three dimensions of research, development and 
demonstration (RD&D), adoption, and organizational change, and address in-
teractions between them. Second, we include not only regulated entities in our 
analysis, but also corporate actors from other value chain positions relevant for 
innovation outcomes (Pavitt, 1984). Third, we specifically address firm hetero-
geneity to understand how the innovation impact of the EU ETS differs accord-
ing to firm characteristics, such as a firm’s technology portfolio. Fourth, we also 
explicitly address the role of context factors to account for the multitude of de-
terminants of corporate innovation activities (see e.g. del Río González, 2005, 
Horbach, 2008, OECD, 2007). 
We limit our study to the power sector because it constitutes by far the largest 
share of CO2 emissions covered by the scheme (EU, 2005). The power sector 
is also the largest contributor to CO2 emissions in the rest of the world and thus 
plays a key role in future innovation and emission reductions (IEA, 2009b). Fur-
thermore, we confine our analysis to Germany as it exhibits a fairly diversified 
mix of power generation technologies and is characterized by significant capac-
ity renewal needs (IEA, 2007, Platts, 2008). We base our analysis on multiple 
company case studies because such a methodological approach enables us to The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
Findings of company case studies in the German Power Sector  3 
 
uncover the complex effects and causal links relevant for corporate innovation 
decision making (Yin, 2002). 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the research framework, 
section 3 describes the case study methodology, and section 4 presents our 
findings on the impact of the EU ETS on RD&D, adoption, and organizational 
change. Finally, section 5 discusses them and section 6 concludes with re-
search and policy recommendations. 
2  Research framework 
We build our conceptualization of innovation on the Oslo Manual and focus on 
innovations new to the firm (OECD, 2005). In line with neoclassical (Requate, 
2005) and evolutionary studies (Oltra and Saint Jean, 2005), we differentiate 
innovation into research and adoption and add organizational change as third 
innovation dimension (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995, Edquist, 1997, 
Armbruster et al., 2008). Regarding research, development, and demonstration 
(RD&D), ‘research’ stands for basic laboratory research, ‘development’ consists 
of testing the new technology at a small scale in pilot projects, and ‘demonstra-
tion’ refers to the first larger-scale implementation of the technology. We con-
ceptualize adoption as companies’ investments in state-of-the-art technologies. 
It encompasses both investments in new installations and retrofits of existing 
ones, thereby determining the diffusion of commercially available technologies. 
Finally, organizational change consists of procedural change, structural change, 
and vision change. We are particularly interested in activities contributing to a 
reduction of GHG emissions and refer to them as corporate climate innovation 
activities. 
Since the recent literature has pointed out that a policy’s design features may 
be more influential for innovation than the instrument type (Kemp and Pontoglio, 
2008, Vollebergh, 2007), we do not merely consider the EU ETS’ carbon price 
and thus its nature as a market-based instrument. Instead, we focus on two de-
sign features that have previously been identified as important: stringency 
(Frondel et al., 2007, 2008) and predictability (Jänicke et al., 2000, Hoffmann et 
al., 2008). Stringency measures the necessary monetary effort in a given firm 
for complying with the environmental requirements of the policy instrument EU 
ETS (Bernauer et al., 2006). One element of the stringency of the EU ETS is its 
cap and the corresponding market price for CO2. In addition, its specific policy 
details, such as the share of auctioning, the rules governing the allocation of 4  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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allowances free of charge, or the share of CDM/JI credits allowed for compli-
ance, also determine its overall stringency (Betz et al., 2006). Predictability cap-
tures the degree of certainty associated with a policy instrument and its future 
development. This concerns the instrument’s overall direction, detailed rules, 
and timing. Since the EU ETS operates in relatively short trading phases (3 and 
5 years) with specific policy details as elaborated in the National Allocation 
Plans of Member States (Schleich et al., 2009), the scheme is associated with 
large regulatory uncertainty (Hoffmann et al., 2008, 2009). Predictability is par-
ticularly relevant for sectors with long-lived capital-intensive investments, such 
as the power sector.  
Since corporate innovation activities depend on a variety of firm-external and 
firm-internal factors (Rehfeld et al., 2007, del Río González, 2009), we also in-
clude context factors and firm characteristics in our research framework. Con-
text factors cover, first, the policy mix, which is constituted by the main policies 
other than the one under investigation. In our research case, important other poli-
cies include renewables support schemes (particularly the German feed-in-tariffs), 
the nuclear phase-out law, and R&D subsidies (IEA, 2007). The policy mix also 
incorporates long-term climate policy targets at the UN, EU, and national level, as 
well as the project-based Kyoto Mechanisms CDM and JI. Second, context fac-
tors include market factors such as prices, market structure, and demand as 
established innovation determinants (e. g. Newell et al., 1999). For the power 
sector, these market factors include, for example, equipment prices, fuel prices 
and security of supply concerns, particularly for gas. Finally, public acceptance 
of technologies and thus their legitimacy can be an influential context factor 
(Hekkert et al., 2007).  
By including firm characteristics, we explicitly acknowledge the heterogeneity of 
corporate actors and their strategies (Barney, 1991). First, as the power sector 
is a supplier-dominated sector (Pavitt, 1984) we pay particular attention to firms’ 
value chain position (Mazzanti and Zoboli, 2006). We thus study both power 
generators as actors directly regulated by the EU ETS and technology provid-
ers. Second, we follow Christensen and Rosenbloom (1995) by including a 
company’s technology portfolio because the type and share of technologies in a 
company’s portfolio determines its technological capabilities and its exposure to 
the EU ETS. Third, we take account of company size, which may predetermine 
a company’s scope and patterns of action. Finally, our framework encompasses 
a company’s general strategic proactivity and its capability of establishing a 
shared long-term vision (Hart, 1995). Vision also alludes to the recognition that The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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collective frames may have to be broken in order to do things fundamentally 
differently (Kaplan and Tripsas, 2008). 
Figure 1 summarizes our research framework for investigating the innovation 
impact of the EU ETS subject to the influence of context factors and the varying 
characteristics of firms. 





















3  Method 
In order to empirically analyze how companies are changing their innovation 
activities in response to the EU ETS, we chose a multiple case study approach 
as it is particularly appropriate for studying complex contemporary phenomena 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 2002).  
3.1  Sample selection 
In selecting our cases, the goal was not to design a statistically representative 
sample, but to allow for analytic generalizations about the innovation impact of 
the EU ETS. Such an analytic generalization of findings requires their literal and 
theoretical replication, which is facilitated by the application of theoretical sam-
pling (Yin, 2002). This implies that, on the one hand, our theoretical sample in-6  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
  Findings of company case studies in the German Power Sector 
cludes at least two comparable companies so as to ensure the ability of finding 
similar results with different cases, i.e. literal replication. For example, we 
choose at least two technology providers with comparable firm characteristics, 
such as their technology portfolio and size (third column of Table 1). On the 
other hand, by choosing firms with different firm characteristics we allow for 
theoretical replication, i.e. the identification of contrasting results but for predict-
able reasons. For example, we interviewed both diversified and specialized 
technology providers (second column in Table 1).  
Table 1: Overview of case studies 
Value Chain Position  Other Characteristics  Cases  Interviews 
Power Generator (PG)  Large   3  34  Medium-sized 4 
Technology Provider 
(TP) 
Large (with varying degrees of diversification)  3 
20  Chemical process technology (for CCS)  3 
Biogas 2 
Wind 2 
Project Developer (PD)  Diversified incumbents  2  7 
Total 19  61 
In order to generate a broad sample with a high level of variation, we incorpo-
rated both large incumbents and smaller corporate actors. We also included 
companies active in established (e.g. coal, gas) as well as in emerging power 
generation technologies (e.g. wind, biogas). These differences in firm character-
istics are an important attribute of our sample as this allows the capturing of the 
diversity and heterogeneity of corporate innovation responses to the EU ETS. 
Finally, in order to triangulate our findings we also enclosed two project devel-
opers, leading to a total of 19 companies.  
3.2  Data collection 
We conducted our case studies between June 2008 and June 2009, at a time 
when the regulatory details for phase 2 were determined and information about 
the review of the EU ETS directive post-2012 was publicly available (EU, 2008c, 
2008a). As part of each company case study, we compiled a detailed back-
ground analysis of archival data, such as annual reports and media coverage, 
which were used to construct customized interview guides. This second source 
of evidence later enabled us to triangulate interview results to ensure construct 
validity. Depending on the organizational setup of companies, we conducted 
between 1 and 7 interviews to cover all functions relevant for innovation – tech-
nology, strategy, sales, and climate policy. This led to a total of 61 interviewed 
experts, or approximately 3 interviewees per case. Interviews were conducted The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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face to face on the company site, with the exception of 5 phone interviews. On 
average, they lasted 70 minutes. As the innovation strategy constitutes a par-
ticularly confidential element of a company’s strategy we did not record the in-
terviews, but at least two researchers were present at each interview who indi-
vidually took detailed notes that were then aggregated to a common interview 
protocol. In addition, we agreed to conceal the identity of our case companies 
and disguise any connection between statements and individual companies. 
Finally, in order to ensure the reliability of our study, we used a standardized 
electronic case study database to facilitate the repetition of the operations of our 
study. 
3.3  Data analysis 
In our analysis, we used the software Atlas.ti and proceeded in four steps. First, 
based on the initial research framework two of the interviewing researchers devel-
oped a common code list with clear definitions of categories. This code list was 
refined when coding the first case interviews. In a second step, one researcher 
coded the interview transcripts. Third, based on this code work both researchers 
identified where the EU ETS had a strong, mixed, or negligible impact on corporate 
innovation activities. In analyzing these impacts, different elements of the frame-
work were causally interlinked. Finally, the researchers refined their code list in 
order to understand in greater detail the issues touched upon by their preliminary 
findings. Based on this final code list, the second researcher recoded all interview 
transcripts in order to confirm and further refine earlier findings. Throughout the 
data analysis process, we applied pattern-matching and addressed rival explana-
tions to enhance the internal validity of our results (Yin, 2002).  
4  Results 
Below, we present the EU ETS’ main effects on the three innovation dimensions 
RD&D (4.1), adoption (4.2), and organizational change (4.3) and explain the 
influence of the most important context factors and firm characteristics. We 
support our findings with exemplary quotes in the text as well as in summary 
tables.  8  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
  Findings of company case studies in the German Power Sector 
4.1  Impact on research, development, and demonstration 
4.1.1  RD&D on CO2 capture technologies 
We find that the EU ETS has led to a significant intensification of RD&D activi-
ties on CO2 capture technologies (CCS). While laboratory research on CCS had 
already been conducted by large diversified technology providers in the nine-
ties, the introduction of the EU ETS triggered a strong increase in corporate 
CCS research, demonstrated by the initiation of pilot projects and plans for 
demonstration projects. This is illustrated by one power generator: “Emission 
trading is quite clearly the driver for R&D in CCS." As a consequence, private 
funding of CCS RD&D has risen significantly, with the largest share originating 
from large power generators. While companies pinpoint their initial spike in en-
gagement to the EU ETS, the prospect of its continuation is what maintains it at 
a high level. Additionally, the prospect of full auctioning in the EU ETS from 
2013 onwards seems to have further facilitated power generators’ interest, as 
illustrated by one technology provider: “The fear of 100% auctioning after 2012 
has led to sharply increased interest from utilities".  
Apart from the EU ETS, a number of context factors seem important for the ob-
served developments. First and foremost, the prospects of stringent long-term 
climate policy and debates about the introduction of command and control 
measures, such as performance standards for thermal power plants, are further 
spurring EU ETS triggered large-scale corporate RD&D activities as they indi-
cate that CCS will be a must-have technology. Furthermore, RD&D on CCS is 
supported by public research funds which have also recently increased. The 
lack of public acceptance for coal is another driver, yet companies are also 
struggling with potential public resistance against CCS. This is explained by one 
technology provider: "A big uncertainty is whether CCS will gain political accep-
tance in the future, but for utilities the lack of acceptance for coal-fired power 
plants – their image problem – is an important reason to put money into CCS 
R&D". Thus despite this uncertainty incumbents are pursuing CCS RD&D to be 
able to further rely on coal as their core business, as illustrated by one power 
generator: “Coal is dead without CCS, [..] [We conduct] CCS research, since 
otherwise no long-term use of coal is possible due to the climate issue." By 
now, these research activities are taken very seriously as they are seen as im-
portant for ensuring companies’ future competitiveness.  
Regarding firm characteristics, companies’ choice of which technological CCS 
routes to pursue at which intensity is influenced by their technology portfolio, i.e. The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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the underlying core strategies and competencies. 1 For example, power genera-
tors’ RD&D intensities appear especially large if the replacement need and thus 
the age of their coal plants and share of coal in their portfolio is high, as de-
scribed by one such generator: "[We have] not done much yet [..] the pressure 
on us is less because of our relatively new coal-fired power plants" . Yet regard-
less of their portfolio composition, postcombustion appeals to all coal-based 
power generators alike due to its suitability for retrofitting and its flexibility. While 
the efforts of power generators are to a large extent driven by the EU ETS, 
technology providers’ increased RD&D activities are typically driven by their 
customers’ needs, illustrating the trickledown effect of the EU ETS through the 
value chain. For them, core strategies and competencies again determine their 
choice of CCS routes. For example, technology providers creating a major part 
of their added value through boilers strategically chose the oxyfuel route which 
implies the sale of boilers, while others predominantly chose IGCC. This was, 
as explained by a project developer, in order "to push [the sale of] their gas tur-
bines". Finally, the involvement of power generators in CCS RD&D partnerships 
with technology providers appears more intense than is usually the case. More-
over, for all three technological CCS routes new RD&D cooperations have been 
formed with technology providers of the chemical industry. 
4.1.2  RD&D on coal efficiency 
Our case studies reveal that the EU ETS has accelerated previously ongoing 
incremental RD&D activities focusing on new materials to increase the energy 
efficiency of new coal plants up to 50% and beyond (‘50+’). The first main rea-
son for this acceleration is the CO2 price, while the second is the efficiency 
losses that would occur if CCS was installed in the future. This is illustrated by 
one power generator: “To take such a risk to go from 46% to 50% is alone not 
such a big incentive in terms of fuel savings - that is doubled by the fact that the 
[prices for] CO2  emissions are taken into account [..] the leverage is even 
greater if I then go in the direction of CO2 capture and storage."  
That is, regarding context factors, fuel prices and corresponding fuel cost sav-
ings remain a prime motivation for RD&D on coal efficiency, but are now sup-
plemented. In addition, the lack of public acceptance for new coal plants ap-
pears to further augment the coal efficiency RD&D engagement of large incum-
 
1   The three main routes are postcombustion, integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC), 
and oxyfuel. 10  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
  Findings of company case studies in the German Power Sector 
bents, as well as the perceived security of supply of coal. Of course, this line of 
research has also been benefiting from public RD&D funding, particularly at 
early stages. 
Regarding firm characteristics, all large power generators, as well as technology 
providers with a big share of coal technologies in their portfolio, have been ac-
tive in coal efficiency RD&D. Firm-internal reasons for an investment in ‘50+’ 
RD&D also include the German engineering mentality to strive for the best 
technological solutions. 
4.1.3  RD&D on gas efficiency 
The EU ETS’ impact on incremental RD&D activities on gas technologies that 
aim for higher efficiency appears to be positive but relatively small. This strik-
ingly low importance of the EU ETS can be explained by the high share of the 
fuel price relative to the CO2 price, as elucidated by one technology provider: 
“Emissions trading is driving investments [in gas power plants] [..] The driver for 
innovation is however the gas price [..] not the ETS".  
This means that context factors, and here in particular the relatively high gas 
prices dominate gas efficiency RD&D. In addition, technology providers con-
tinue to invest large amounts of money into this line of research due to fierce 
competition, as gas turbines represent a high value core product. This is illus-
trated by one technology provider: “Efficiency is a need to have [issue], a lot of 
work is being done here [..], but it is not because of emission trading - one must 
have at least as much as the competitors, otherwise you do not get a contract." 
Regarding firm characteristics, the players active in gas efficiency RD&D are 
again predominantly large incumbents with gas technologies in their core portfo-
lio. The major share of investment continues to be made by technology provid-
ers. 
4.1.4  RD&D on wind turbines 
Our analysis shows that the EU ETS has a very limited and only indirect impact 
on the ongoing rapid incremental innovation activities for wind power2, resulting 
from learning effects due to the increased adoption of wind turbines (see 4.2.4). 
                                            
2   Currently, wind RD&D activities are primarily aiming at output maximization, cost minimiza-
tion, reliability improvement, grid management and offshore commercialization. The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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The EU ETS contributes to this with the outlook that wind energy is on the verge 
of becoming competitive through rising electricity prices and decreased attrac-
tiveness of investments in fossil-based power generation. However, currently 
this does not seem to affect wind RD&D, as illustrated by one technology pro-
vider:  “Climate policy does not play a role in technical innovation [for wind 
power plants], but turbine development is driven by markets and feed-in tariffs." 
That is, context factors are clearly the most relevant drivers for RD&D on wind 
turbines. Here, public support mechanisms for renewables such as the German 
feed-in law with its degressive tariff structure and comparable policies in other 
countries continue to be the underlying prime motivation for wind RD&D be-
cause they result in a large demand for wind turbines and stable market growth. 
These RD&D activities are further supported by high public acceptance rates 
and long-term climate policy prospects. Finally, there is no general pattern of 
firm characteristics which further explains the negligible innovation impact of the 
EU ETS for wind RD&D.3 
Table 2: Key findings and exemplary quotes regarding RD&D 
Key findings on RD&D impact of EU ETS and exemplary quotes 
EU ETS strongly increased CCS RD&D activities of large-scale incumbents. 
  “The commercialization of CCS – pilot and demonstration projects – is conditional upon the 
operationalization of the EU ETS; otherwise neither power generators nor technology pro-
viders would get heavily involved.” [TP] 
  “The only reason you do [CCS R&D] is because avoiding CO2 represents a value and you 
can say that from a certain CO2 price upwards, the additional consumption of resources 
[coal, money] is worth it.” [PG] 
Coal efficiency RD&D accelerated due to EU ETS and CCS efficiency losses. 
  “To be able to do this CO2 separation, [..] [it is] extremely important to have the highest 
possible efficiency. This is why CO2 trading is a really important point.” [PG] 
  “The 700°C technology would have probably happened even without emissions trading. 
Lignite drying, on the other hand [..] would probably not have been pushed as hard without 
the EU ETS. Compensating the efficiency losses of CCS is now the next step.” [PG] 
EU ETS only marginally adds to fuel prices and fierce competition which remain the main driv-
ers for gas efficiency RD&D. 
  “Gas only profits additionally from ETS, ETS is not the trigger for R&D!” [TP] 
  “So far, efficiency increases [have] been linked to fuel prices, now CO2 is added as a new 
factor […] [but] gas is already quite advanced [..] the R&D budget is very high because 
there has already been a lot of stiff competition.” [TP]
                                            
3   By and large, this low indirect impact of the EU ETS on wind RD&D is exemplary for RD&D 
activities for other renewables. A similar argument also holds for nuclear power generation 
technologies. 12  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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Direct EU ETS impact on RD&D for wind and other renewables negligible, but indirect con-
tribution to acceleration of technological progress through increased adoption. 
  ”The CO2-price is too low to determine the course, but we are watching it." [TP] 
   “The decision to say that renewable energies make up a significant share of generation – in 
our portfolio – then automatically leads to everything to do with research and development 
receiving higher priority.” [PG] 
4.2  Impact on adoption 
4.2.1  Adoption of new coal power plants 
Regarding the adoption of new coal plants, the role of the EU ETS has changed 
significantly due to the switch from very favourable gratis allocation rules to full 
auctioning of EU allowances beginning in 2013. Initially, the generous coal 
benchmarks and standard load factors have functioned as quasi-subsidy lead-
ing to a temporary increase in planned coal plants (see e.g. Ellermann, 2008). 
This attractiveness of new coal even improved further due to the ‘guaranteed‘ 
free-of-charge allocation for 14 years, leading to a rush of getting plants opera-
tional by 2012. 4 As one power generator highlighted: "In 2005 every power 
plant was profitable thanks to the free allocation." However, with the an-
nouncement of full auctioning in 2008 these subsidy effects vanished, making 
coal less profitable and intensifying site-specific engineering efforts, as illus-
trated by another power generator: "The introduction of 100% auctioning exer-
cises [..] pressure on the coal projects, but no project is completely called into 
question because of auctioning.“  
The main reasons for the ongoing cancellations of some planned coal plants 
seem to be context factors. The prime cancellation reason appears to be market 
factors, particularly the significant increase of equipment prices, rendering some 
projects unprofitable. Another important withdrawal reason is the lack of public 
acceptance for coal plants in Germany, as pointed out by one power generator: 
“To communicate coal is like squaring the circle". In addition, these anti-coal 
protests and resulting image problems together with the EU ETS support the 
planning of new coal plants as capture-ready, a trend that is also driven by re-
strictive governmental approval conditions. However, the perceived security of 
                                            
4   The EU Commission prohibited the application of the so-called 14-year rule in its decision 
on Germany’s second allocation plan on November 29, 2006 (EU, 2006). The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
Findings of company case studies in the German Power Sector  13 
 
supply and the favourable coal-to-gas price ratio remain strong drivers for pre-
ferring new coal over new gas plants.  
Regarding firm characteristics, we find that companies with large shares of coal 
in their portfolio tend to stick to their core competency, as explained by one 
coal-only power generator: “Diversification is rather uninteresting for us: what 
we are good at is burning coal.” In contrast, power generators with gas-
dominated or gas-only portfolios – being driven by regulatory and market uncer-
tainties – favour investments in coal so as to diversify their portfolio: "We want 
to have coal [in our portfolio], even against the trend" [PG].  
4.2.2  Adoption of new gas power plants 
We find that the incentives the EU ETS generates seem hitherto often insuffi-
cient for ultimately deciding in favor of new gas plants. As one power generator 
explained: "Emissions trading is relevant but not essential for the decision to 
fuel with coal or gas."  
The main reason for this smaller than expected impact of the EU ETS on new 
gas plants lies in the domain of context factors. Compared to the relatively 
moderate CO2-prices, high gas prices combined with security of supply con-
cerns are often perceived as more important. This is illustrated by one power 
generator: "Without a long-term contract, the political dependency on gas from 
one country is too high", and supplemented by one technology provider: "The 
assumed gas price has a greater influence than the CO2 price." Regarding firm 
characteristics, we only find that power generators with decentralized genera-
tion and low-carbon visions are less reluctant to invest in new gas. 
4.2.3  Adoption of coal plant retrofits 
We find that the EU ETS contributes to an increase in retrofit activities, particu-
larly for older coal plants which can be traced back to CO2 prices and specific 
allocation rules. One power generator clarified: "The ETS has set a strong trig-
ger to review the topics [...] [retrofit measures] have become cost effective 
through the ETS".  
However, context factors such as fuel costs and electricity prices remain very 
relevant for retrofits: "Efficiency has always been important independent of CO2, 
but the incentives of the EU ETS strengthen the fuel cost basis." Further motiva-
tions for lifetime extensions are the current lack of public acceptance for con-14  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
  Findings of company case studies in the German Power Sector 
structing new coal plants (see 4.2.1), regulatory uncertainties of the EU ETS, 
and the political and technological uncertainties associated with CCS (see 
4.1.1). We did not notice striking differences due to firm characteristics aside 
from the straightforward relevance of power plant portfolios.  
4.2.4  Portfolio shift towards renewables 
While its overall impact on individual projects has so far been limited as other 
factors tend to be more important, the EU ETS is contributing to a strategic ad-
justment of power generators’ target portfolios towards diversification and more 
specifically towards renewables. As one power generator said: "This target port-
folio [...] would definitely look different if there were no cost burdens from CO2 
certificates." Another power generator explained the close link between the EU 
ETS and international climate policy: "Now we are looking much more at the 
portfolio effect. [...] Both long-term climate policy and emissions trading have 
contributed to this [...], but without emissions trading and the price for CO2 a 
company would not do that.“  
However, this portfolio shift towards renewables would not have occured if there 
were no public support for renewables making investments in renewables prof-
itable and low risk. Closely connected to this key context factor are the tremen-
dous market growth prospects for renewables, particularly for wind. As one 
power generator explained: "The one market [renewables] is growing, politically 
driven, at the expense of the other [fossil] market. There are several arguments 
in favour of engaging in the growth market.“ The lack of public acceptance for 
coal and nuclear further supports this shift. 
Regarding  firm characteristics, almost all power generators reported an in-
crease in portfolio thinking and renewables investment. The choice of renew-
able power generation technologies is mainly determined by geographic con-
straints, with smaller power generators being more bound to "regional availabil-
ities", as put by one of them. Leadership and vision (see 4.3.2) were mentioned 
as very important for going forward with these investments, as explained by an-
other power generator: ”[The wind investments are] rather driven by strategic 
considerations, but [the former CEO] would not have accepted wind power.” 
 The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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Table 3: Key findings and exemplary quotes regarding adoption 
Key findings on adoption impact of EU ETS and exemplary quotes 
Initially, spike in planned large-scale coal power plants due to free allocation; decreased profit-
ability due to 100% auctioning not as decisive for cancellations as increased equipment prices 
and lack of public acceptance. 
  “In 2004 [before the start of the EU ETS] and today [November 2008] the premises [for build-
ing our new coal-fired power station] were strongly driven by electricity supply shortages, in 
Phase 1, in contrast, they were profit-driven. [..] the [EU Comission’s] decision against the 
14a rule almost overturned this.” [PG] 
  “Decisive for the project termination [..] were [..] mainly [the increased] equipment prices, then 
market uncertainties, that is mainly coal prices and also CO2 prices.” [PG]  
  “Because of acceptance problems [we can see] coal investments are switching to countries 
where coal is approved, along the lines of: if necessary, I’ll locate my coal power station in 
Romania or even outside the ETS zone.” [TP] 
EU ETS impact on gas adoption weaker than expected due to comparatively high gas prices 
(relative to the CO2 price) and problems in obtaining long-term gas contracts.  
  “ETS is generally a factor for the choice of fuel, but gas and equipment prices are even more 
important and more uncertain.” [PG] 
  “We made the decision in favour of coal for two reasons: first it was […] more economic [than 
gas] and second, without a long-term contract, gas is politically too heavily dependent on 
one state.” [PG] 
EU ETS additional direct and indirect driver for coal plant retrofits due to increased profitability 
of lifetime extension and/or efficiency increases. 
  "The ETS has set a strong trigger to review the topics [...] [the retrofit measures] have be-
come cost effective through the ETS". [PG] 
EU ETS and long-term climate policy indirectly contribute to shift in future portfolio towards 
renewables but investments would not materialize without public renewables support. 
  “There is a portfolio effect which comes about indirectly via climate policy and directly due to 
the internal target of CO2 neutrality. On individual concrete projects, in contrast, climate poli-
cy has limited influence.” [PG] 
  “Climate policy played a massive role in getting into renewables because when [..] looking at 
the portfolio structure and then the climate targets formulated around us in the order of 50% 
by 2030 or 80% by 2050, then as a company you have to find a role there somewhere. [..] 
Emission trading doesn’t go that far. But we can assume that policy makers will come up 
with some kind of instrument to implement these targets.” [PG]  
  “The four main reasons for going into [offshore] wind are diversification, our renewal need, 
the CO2 costs of fossil fuels [..] and thus competetive prices for wind, and the EEG [German 
feed-in law]. Without the EEG payment for offshore we would not have invested in it – this is 
the same for all other utilities, too.” [PG] 
 
4.3  Impact on organizational change 
As the impact of the EU ETS on organizational change mainly differs between 
value chain positions, in presenting our findings we distinguish between power 
generators and technology providers. 16  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
  Findings of company case studies in the German Power Sector 
4.3.1  Procedural change 
We find that the EU ETS has a strong impact on the business procedures of 
power generators but also on those of some technology providers, and as such 
has been changing companies’ CO2 culture. Companies have quickly integrated 
the new cost factor CO2 in their routines, such as into investment appraisals or 
even employee suggestion systems. This routinization is illustrated by one 
power generator: "CO2 is now part of all investment appraisals. This alone has 
an impact." We also find increased top management attention to CO2 issues, 
particularly for power generators. This is illustrated by one power generator stat-
ing that "the EU ETS [..] has now arrived at the board level." Finally, while the 
procedural change started with operational issues, it has been continuously 
moving towards strategic issues, which is illustrated by another power genera-
tor: "Operationally [the EU ETS] was of course immediately [integrated], but with 
regard to the generation strategy it took a certain time to be able to estimate [..] 
the scope and mode of action [..] of CO2 certificate prices for an investment de-
cision.“ 
Power generators have decentrally integrated the EU ETS in relevant business 
procedures: “We have no specific person responsible for climate policy [...] Eve-
ryone plays his part [...] the issue of climate has been decentrally integrated into 
the company.“ In contrast, for technology providers the business procedures 
most impacted by the EU ETS are those associated with sales, particularly for 
large diversified technology providers: "Initially there was a staff position which 
[...] explored what CDM and EU ETS meant [for us] as suppliers, that is, where 
these mechanisms impact our customers“. 
4.3.2  Vision change 
We observe a change in companies’ visions driven by long-term climate policy 
targets, including for renewables. However, the EU ETS and the support 
schemes for renewables as the operationalization of these targets are also con-
tributing to these corporate vision changes. 
Among power generators, strategic questions like the following are common: 
"What does the instrumentalization of climate policy mean for [us]: how are we 
positioning ourselves in the future?". As a consequence, many power genera-
tors set long-term targets for renewables, CO2 emission reductions, and energy 
efficiency improvements. These are typically oriented towards the EU’s 2020 The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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goals (EU, 2008b)5 but are also driven by "the feed-in law and the public [cli-
mate] discussion in general”. That is, for such vision changes the EU ETS is just 
one aspect embedded in the larger landscape changes associated with climate 
change. 
Regarding technology providers, we find that the extent of climate policy trig-
gered vision changes depends – even more so than for power generators – on 
the carbon-intensity and diversification of their technology portfolio. For renew-
ables, large diversified technology providers foresee these technologies as be-
coming equally important as their current fossil core business. This is best ex-
emplified by wind power, for which the large players attempt to join the special-
ized technology providers in exploiting the booming market, while for wind spe-
cialists climate policy only further enhances their market visions. In contrast, for 
biogas specialists climate policy in the form of the CDM has influenced entry 
into new geographical markets, as stressed by one: “We want to be present in 
the markets in South East Asia and Latin America. [..] without CDM [we would] 
never have thought of offering our own products in developing countries." Fi-
nally, technology providers with CCS related know-how envisage a potential 
new market: "The idea is to make CCS an independent business unit [...]. Inter-
national competitors have similar visions.” Yet, for coal specialists we find that 
climate policy in its current form does not break the existing mental frame. In-
stead, these actors are driven by the growing coal business around the world. 
4.3.3  Structural change 
The impact of the EU ETS on structural change falls into two categories: the 
set-up of CDM/JI sourcing units, and the indirect contribution to the establish-
ment of new business units for renewables resulting from climate policy trig-
gered vision changes (see 4.3.2). 
For power generators, the first structural change concerns all large power gen-
erators, and also a single medium-sized one, who established new business 
units for the sourcing of credits from the Clean Development Mechanism and 
Joint Implementation (CDM/JI) to reduce EU ETS compliance costs. As one 
power generator explained: “[the shortage allocation in phase 2 is] a completely 
different lever, which no one predicted. We try to prevent the worst, [..] so a new 
 
5   A 20% reduction of CO2 emissions, an increase in the share of renewable energies to 20%, 
and a 20% improvement of energy efficiency. 18  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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business unit CDM is being built up." Some large power generators see this 
engagement in CDM projects in developing countries as “the head of the inter-
national expansion considerations" since "the project-based mechanisms allow 
us to get to know new markets more quickly" [PG]. Second, power generators 
which changed their vision regarding renewables have been adjusting their or-
ganizational structure accordingly by establishing new business units for re-
newables in which new competencies are being developed. These units are 
characterized by their own subculture and equipped with relatively large invest-
ment budgets (see 4.2.4). A technology provider explained these developments: 
"All utillities [..]  have established independent subsidiaries for renewables - with 
nice marketing names. [..] There is a different working environment in these 
subsidiaries, other people work there and the workforce is much younger, this is 
necessary as different know-how is required for renewable energies than was 
present in the utilities." Similarly, one project developer reported: "1 ½ years 
ago [2007] the utilities became restless [...] they headhunted colleagues, in the 
meantime they pay strategic prices, and push back the institutional investors.“  
Large, diversified technology providers whose vision changed towards renew-
ables have also adjusted their organizational structures to reflect the ever in-
creasing market potential of renewables. This can go so far as positioning re-
newables on the same organizational level as conventional power generation 
technologies. 
Table 4: Key findings and exemplary quotes regarding organizational change 
Key findings on organizational impact of EU ETS and exemplary quotes 
EU ETS causes quick changes in routines within all power generators and to a lesser extent in 
technology providers with a diversified portfolio. 
  “There have been quite a few organizational changes due to the introduction of the EU ETS. 
[..] CO2 is integrated in investment appraisals [..] It is also a price factor in suggestions for 
improvements, both for saving potentials and for determining premiums”. [PG]  
  "At the beginning, CO2 was located in the long-term research division [..] the more concrete it 
became, the more it went into the product areas." [TP] 
Interpretation of EU ETS and support for renewables as operationalization of overarching long-
term targets drives vision changes. 
   "Until now, we have underutilized the opportunities [for renewables] which emerged from 
such a changed environment. [..] [We] coordinated corporate goals in agreement with EU 
targets.” [PG] 
  “Two years ago CCS was not even mentioned in the annual strategy paper; last year it did 
get a mention, but only a weak one. This year, its share in the strategy paper has greatly in-
creased. If policy pushes it even more, another quantum leap will take place. In a few years, 
CCS could account for at least 50% of turnover [..] – assuming demonstration plants are ac-
tually built in the future. At present, however, there is no doubt about this on the part of 
[power generators].” [TP] The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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Vision changes are followed by structural change towards renewables, but EU ETS only 
plays a minor indirect role. 
 “ [From 2007/8 on] there was a shift in perspective because people realized that there are 
problems with the market development and growth of traditional business and, on the other 
hand, that increased social and energy policy interest will definitely result in renewables 
playing a role in the long term and that even now they are already experiencing a shift to-
wards core business, i.e. that you can earn good money with it.” [PG] 
  “Based on a strategic study our board authorized the set-up of a CDM sourcing team 1.5 
years ago [spring 2007]. [..] The motivation for this is the generation of credits for EU ETS 
plants [..] We want to make full use of the 22% limit, because the [price] spread is still worth 
it [..] If climate continues to be an important topic, then we will extend our engagement.” 
[PG] 
  “After the restructuring, renewables are now on a par with oil/gas etc. – that was not formerly 
the case, they used to be somewhere behind power stations – the topic of climate has had 
an impact on the organization.” [TP] 
 
5  Discussion 
Our analysis suggests that the EU ETS by itself will not provide sufficient incen-
tives for fundamental changes in corporate climate innovation activities at a 
scale appropriate for achieving longer-term GHG emission reduction needs as 
indicated by climate science (IPCC, 2007a). Instead, the optimal corporate de-
cisions to reach near to medium targets, i.e. up to 2020, might not be optimal for 
reaching long-term targets because they lead to path-dependencies that render 
the required longer-term reductions extremely difficult and costly to achieve. In 
the following, we discuss our findings and derive policy recommendations. 
5.1  Impact on different innovation dimensions  
Our findings show that the innovation impact of the EU ETS varies tremen-
dously across technologies and firms. As expected, the largest impact occurs 
among the most carbon-intensive technologies and among incumbents with 
large-scale coal power generation technologies in their portfolios. In contrast, 
the innovation impact of the EU ETS on low- or zero-carbon mitigation options 
tends to be very limited. In addition, the scheme scores very differently on our 
three innovation dimensions.  
First, regarding RD&D we find the largest impact of the EU ETS for CCS and 
coal technologies being carried out by large incumbents in cooperation with 
chemical industry players. Our analysis highlights that companies’ choices 
among the wide array of RD&D activities mainly depend on their core strategies 
and competencies and the expected market relevance. Second, for adoption 
decisions context factors, such as fuel prices, public acceptance, or renewables 20  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
  Findings of company case studies in the German Power Sector 
support, tend to be more decisive than the EU ETS. The only exception was the 
temporarily skyrocketed attractiveness of new coal plants resulting from fuel-
specific free allocation. With today’s prospect of full auctioning, in principle the 
EU ETS now favours the choice of less carbon-intensive fuels. Yet the CO2 
price level tends to be too low for leading companies to adopt new gas instead 
of new coal plants, and may also be insufficiently low to render CCS profitable. 
Third, regarding organizational change, we find that the EU ETS was the prime 
motivation for routine changes and the set up of JI/CDM business units of 
power generators. The EU ETS also brought climate change onto the agenda of 
top-management and may ultimately be contributing to the breaking of mental 
frames of incumbent power generators. However, the resulting observed vision 
changes for renewables are mainly driven by long-term climate targets whose 
credibility is significantly increased by operationalizing them through the EU 
ETS. Still, without the existence of feed-in tariffs these vision changes would not 
have led to the observed structural changes within incumbents.  
These findings have important implications for policy makers. First, even with 
auctioning the adoption of new gas plants faces significant barriers which will 
only be overcome at relatively high CO2 price levels. Second, technologies from 
emerging renewables regimes need to be promoted through policies other than 
the EU ETS. Finally, policy makers should increase their scenario-building ef-
forts to produce and clearly communicate credible political visions of the power 
sector as these can constitute very important benchmarks for fundamentally 
changing corporate strategies. 
5.2  Interactions between innovation dimensions 
Our analysis reveals how feedback loops between the three innovation dimen-
sions shape the impact of the EU ETS on technological change. Here, we focus 
on two interaction effects. First, the observed portfolio shift of most power gen-
erators towards renewable power generation technologies appears to be lead-
ing to a shift in their RD&D focus towards renewables as well. In a similar vein, 
such increased demand for low-carbon technologies is associated with higher 
production levels for technology providers and strengthened operation experi-
ences, thereby accelerating learning curve effects and thus incremental innova-
tions.  
Second, for coal power plants in the short run the EU ETS triggered increase in 
lifetime extending retrofits opens up the opportunity to postpone the replace-
ment of existing plants with more efficient new ones, yet may lead to a rise in The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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emissons. In order that today’s retrofits become environmentally beneficial in 
the long run, policy makers ought to strengthen the stringency of existing and 
envisaged climate policies. Subsequently, assuming that current political and 
technological uncertainties are solved rather soon, retrofitting today may lead to 
investments in more “radical” low-carbon technologies in later years.  
5.3  Role of EU ETS design features 
In general, our research confirms that a higher CO2-price resulting from a tighter 
emission cap increases the EU ETS’ impact on organizational change as well 
as RD&D and the adoption of low-carbon technologies. From this it follows that 
a generous limit on the use of CDM/JI credits, while increasing static efficiency, 
may reduce innovation incentives within the EU, particularly for RD&D on high-
tech solutions. 
Our findings also underline the relevance of EU ETS design details for innova-
tion, which becomes particularly evident by the change in the impact of the EU 
ETS due to the foreseen shift from free allocation to 100% auctioning. The 
higher exposure of carbon-intensive power generators raises their attention and 
effort level and leads them to take the newly established CO2 constraint more 
seriously. It also provides clear guidance for investment decisions, 6 yet alloca-
tion details appear to be most relevant for adoption decisions. Instead, the ex-
pected CO2 price level, the size of future markets, and the scheme’s predictabil-
ity seem to matter most for RD&D decisions, illustrating the particularly promi-
nent role of long-term climate policy.  
Aside from full auctioning for the power sector the most straightforward policy 
advice for strong innovation incentives of the EU ETS is the credible political 
commitment to a long-term GHG reduction path in line with climate science, 
ideally at a global level. The reason for this is that these long-term climate tar-
gets guide corporate climate innovation activities as they are expected to be 
operationalized by policy instruments such as the EU ETS, for which the ambi-
tion level is contingent upon international post-2012 provisions.  
 
6   Due to the temporary nature of free allocation rules, their predicted distortionary influence 
appears to be smaller than what may have otherwise been the case (Ahman et al., 2007, 
Ellermann, 2008). 22  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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5.4  Importance of context factors  
Our analysis shows that so far context factors have often been more decisive 
for corporate climate innovation activities than the EU ETS itself, which is par-
ticularly evident for adoption decisions. For example, for new coal plants lack of 
public acceptance can be equally important as policy and market factors. The 
same is likely to be true for CCS, yet public information campaigns to build le-
gitimacy for this pollution control technology seem inappropriately low consider-
ing the large private and public funding invested in capture technologies.  
Perhaps most importantly, we find a mutual reinforcing effect of the EU ETS 
and other policies, particularly long term climate policy and associated targets, 
as well as renewables support mechanisms. With the introduction of full auc-
tioning, these different elements of the policy mix are well aligned with climate 
mitigation, thus complementing each other and guiding the search of corporate 
actors (Hekkert et al., 2007). For example, while long-term climate policy is ex-
pected to provide the predictability that instruments such as the EU ETS are 
lacking, it is precisely these instruments which ultimately lead companies to ad-
just their strategies.  
Therefore policy makers should strengthen their activities targeted at building 
legitimacy for low- or zero-carbon technologies, which may be particularly chal-
lenging for CCS. They should also strengthen and align all elements of the pol-
icy mix, e.g. by mainstreaming climate change into sectoral policies. Finally, 
efforts to reach an ambitious and credible international post-2012 climate 
agreement need to be increased. 
 
6  Conclusion 
We conclude that, in principle, the regulatory demand-pull of the EU ETS works, 
meaning that the trading scheme contributes to a change in corporate climate 
innovation activities across major parts of the value chain. We thus confirm that 
due to its establishment of a carbon price the EU ETS can serve as basic ele-
ment in a climate policy portfolio (Fischer and Newell, 2008). However, while 
the introduction of full auctioning will generate undistorted carbon signals and 
the EU ETS’ phase 3 cap will significantly contribute to the EU’s efforts in reach-
ing its 2020 targets, the EU ETS by itself is highly unlikely to lead to RD&D and 
adoption decisions in line with reaching the EU’s proposed 2050 targets. Two 
examples supporting this are the limited impact of the EU ETS on renewables 
and demand-side energy savings. Here, complementary policies are needed to The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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create attractive markets for renewables, particularly for technologies not yet 
competitive with conventional power generation technologies and for assisting 
companies in inventing viable business models promoting reductions in power 
consumption. More generally speaking, there is a need for complementing the 
pure carbon price incentives with long-term scenario-building efforts in order to 
start changing established mindsets of incumbents and create new corporate 
visions of the future.  
Furthermore, we argue that through the EU ETS triggered changes in corporate 
routines companies in the power sector are better prepared for a tightening of 
climate policy in line with the 2°C target (UNFCCC, 2009). Nevertheless, while 
large incumbents are finally embracing the growing renewables market, thereby 
being faced with an internal clash of cultures, the majority of their investment is 
still earmarked to conventional technologies. It is therefore questionable 
whether the big players are moving quickly and proactively enough to become 
agents of change for the needed decarbonization of the power sector. Thus, 
keeping markets open and attracting new dynamic and innovative entrants 
seems to be essential. 
Finally, if the EU ETS’s stringency were further tightened to reflect the deep 
emission cuts indicated by climate science (IPCC, 2007b) we expect its innova-
tion impact would increase. In such circumstances, the EU ETS as cornerstone 
of EU climate policy, complemented by other policies, may ultimately live up to 
its potential of guiding the decarbonization of the European power sector. As 
stressed before, a precondition for this may be the passing of an ambitious and 
credible long-term global climate treaty because cap-and-trade can be under-
stood as the operationalization of these overarching mitigation targets. Such a 
treaty would increase the overall predictability for innovators. Furthermore, as 
technology providers innovate for the global market such an international 
agreement should cover all major power markets as these other regions would 
then be likely to follow suit in establishing markets for CO2 reductions and thus 
raise the gains from RD&D activities.  
Our results on the innovation impact of the EU ETS shed some light on what 
may be expected from emission trading schemes being negotiated in the rest of 
the world. Most prominently, the trading scheme being developed in the US 
based on the Waxman-Markey bill (ACES Act, 2009), while including some 
commendable features such as the foreseen long-term reduction path and high 
level of auctioning, is likely to have a relatively moderate impact on corporate 24  The innovation impact of EU emission trading –  
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climate innovation activities in the power sector. This is mainly because the 
foreseen inflow of CO2 price reducing offset credits is too lenient for the scheme 
to ultimately have a decisive impact on adoption as well as RD&D decisions 
leading to the called for decarbonizing of the US power sector. Similarly, based 
on our analysis of the EU ETS, it is also unlikely that the proposed Australian 
carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS Bill, 2009) will be sufficient in promot-
ing technological change up to levels required for a low carbon transformation 
of the Australian power sector due to the combination of a potentially lenient 
target, unlimited offsetting, and a rather low price cap.  
Our study is not without limitations, however, and thus warrants future research. 
As we focused our analysis on the power sector, other studies will have to iden-
tify whether and how the innovation impact of the EU ETS differs across sec-
tors. Additionally, all of our case companies were based in Germany – though 
often with international operations – so it might be useful to check whether 
companies with other home markets have reacted similarly to the EU ETS. 
Moreover, of the actors relevant for innovation in the power sector we only in-
cluded power generators, technology providers, and project developers. While 
this value chain approach goes well beyond the standard of addressing the 
regulated entities only, the analysis could be extended to other actors, particu-
larly to final power consumers, start-ups, and venture capitalists. Finally, while 
our qualitative approach enabled us to study the complex causal links and 
feedback loops of innovation processes in the power sector and how the EU 
ETS is impacting them, innovation surveys allowing for statistical generaliza-
tions should complement this analysis. 
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